An Affordance-Based Approach to the Origins of Concepts

Abstract

Several approaches have taken affordances as a basis for explaining cognitive processes beyond perception and action, such as language, imagination, and social practices. Another critical aspect of our mental life that can be explained from an affordance-based perspective is the origins of concepts. The perceptual basis of concepts is a traditional theme in the history of philosophy, one that has been approached from either a nativist or an empiricist perspective. Here, we seek to explain the natural origins of concepts from an affordance-based perspective that overcomes the traditional nativist versus empiricist debate. We argue that affordances are key to make sense of our experience and our concepts, as they provide the materials from which we can build them up. We sketch a positive, constructive story that explains the origins of concepts starting from experience. We propose the idea of implicit or embodied concepts as a non-discursive link between basic and discursive cognition. These embodied concepts are bodily know-how through which we patternize the world. This bodily know-how is formed, thanks to the experience we gain from perceiving and acting upon affordances. Thus, embodied concepts can be considered affordance-based states that are the missing link between experience and discursive or explicit conceptual content.